Abstract-Binary multimedia identifiable parent property codes (binary t-MIPPCs) are used in multimedia fingerprinting schemes where the identification of users taking part in the averaging collusion attack to illegally redistribute content is required. In this paper, we first introduce a binary strong multimedia identifiable parent property code (binary t-SMIPPC) whose tracing algorithm is more efficient than that of a binary t-MIPPC. Then a composition construction for binary t-SMIPPCs from qary t-SMIPPCs is provided. Several infinite series of optimal q-ary t-SMIPPCs of length 2 with t = 2, 3 are derived from the relationships among t-SMIPPCs and other fingerprinting codes, such as t-separable codes and t-MIPPCs. Finally, combinatorial properties of q-ary 2-SMIPPCs of length 3 are investigated, and optimal q-ary 2-SMIPPCs of length 3 with q ≡ 0, 1, 2, 5 (mod 6) are constructed.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
Odes with the identifiable parent property (t-IPPCs) were first introduced by Hollmann et al. [11] , motivated by the purpose of protecting copyrighted digital contents, and investigated in detail in [2] , [3] , [4] , [14] , [16] . Recently, Cheng et al. [6] introduced a multimedia identifiable parent property code (t-MIPPC) to resist the averaging collusion attack on multimedia contents. They showed that binary tMIPPCs can be used in multimedia fingerprinting to identify, as t-IPPCs do in the generic digital scenario [1] , [11] , at least one such malicious authorized user when the size of the coalition is at most t with computational complexity O(nM t ), where n is the code length and M is the number of codewords, thereby bringing enough pressure to bear on authorized users to give up their attempts at collusion. Obviously, the tracing algorithm based on such a binary t-MIPPC is not efficient for practical use. In this paper, we introduce a new notion of a strong multimedia identifiable parent property code (t-SMIPPC) to resist the averaging attack on multimedia contents in a fingerprinting system. We show that binary t-SMIPPCs can be used in tracing algorithms to identify at least one colluder when the size of the coalition is at most t with computational complexity O(nM ), which is clearly more efficient than those based on binary t-MIPPCs.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review the concepts of fingerprinting, collusion and detection. In Section III, we introduce the notion of a strong multimedia identifiable parent property code, and discuss the tracing algorithm based on this new code. In Section IV, several infinite series of optimal t-SMIPPCs of length 2 with t = 2, 3 are derived. In Section V, optimal q-ary 2-SMIPPCs of length 3 with q ≡ 0, 1, 2, 5 (mod 6) are constructed. Finally, conclusions will be given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a very brief review on some basic terminologies. The interested reader is referred to [9] , [13] for more detailed information.
In collusion-resistant fingerprinting, we want to design fingerprints which can be used to trace and identify colluders after collusion attacks, together with robust embedding of fingerprints into multimedia host signals. Spread-spectrum additive embedding is one of the widely employed robust embedding techniques. Let x be the host multimedia signal, {u i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be an orthonormal basis of noise-like signals, and {w j = (w j (1), w j (2), . . . , w j (n)) = n i=1 b ij u i | 1 ≤ j ≤ M }, b ij ∈ {0, 1}, be a family of scaled watermarks to achieve the imperceptibility as well as to control the energy of the embedded watermark. The watermarked version of the content y j = x + w j , 1 ≤ j ≤ M , is then assigned to the authorized user U j who has purchased the rights to access x. The fingerprint w j assigned to U j can be represented uniquely by a vector (called codeword) b j = (b 1j , b 2j , . . . , b nj )
T ∈ {0, 1} n because of the linear independence of the basis {u i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
When t authorized users, say U j1 , U j2 , . . . , U jt , who have the same host content but different fingerprints come together, we assume that they have no way of manipulating the individual orthonormal signals, that is, the underlying codeword needs to be taken and proceeded as a single entity, but they can carry on a linear collusion attack to generate a pirate copy from their t fingerprinted contents, so that the venture traced by the pirate copy can be attenuated. In additive embedding, this is done by linearly combining the t fingerprinted contents t l=1 λ j l y j l , where the weights {λ j l | 1 ≤ l ≤ t} satisfy the condition t l=1 λ j l = 1 to maintain the average intensity of the original multimedia signal. In this case, the energy of each of the watermarks w j l is reduced by a factor of λ 2 j l , therefore, the trace of U j l 's fingerprint becomes weaker and thus U j l is less likely to be caught by the detector. Since normally no colluder is willing to take more of a risk than any other colluder, averaging attack in which λ j l = 1/t, 1 ≤ l ≤ t, is the most fair choice for each colluder to avoid detection, as claimed in [13] , [15] . This attack also makes the pirate copy have better perceptional quality. Based on the discussions above, the observed content y after averaging attack is
In colluder detection phase, we compute the correlation vector T = (T(1), T(2), . . . , T(n)), where T(i) = y − x, u i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and y−x, u i is the inner product of y−x and u i . We would like to strategically design an anti-collusion code to accurately identify the contributing fingerprints involved in the averaging attack from this detection statistics T.
III. STRONG MULTIMEDIA IDENTIFIABLE PARENT PROPERTY CODES
In this section, we first introduce the notion of a strong multimedia identifiable parent property code (t-SMIPPC), and then discuss the tracing algorithm based on binary SMIPPCs. A composition construction for binary t-SMIPPCs from q-ary t-SMIPPCs is also presented.
Let n, M and q be positive integers, and Q an alphabet with |Q| = q. A set C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c M } ⊆ Q n is called an (n, M, q) code and each c i is called a codeword. Without loss of generality, we may assume Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. When Q = {0, 1}, we also use the word "binary". Given an (n, M, q) code, its incidence matrix is the n × M matrix on Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} in which the columns are the M codewords in C. Often, we make no difference between an (n, M, q) code and its incidence matrix unless otherwise stated.
For any (n, M, q) code C on Q, we define the following shortened code A j i for i ∈ Q and 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
For any code C ⊆ Q n , we define the set of ith coordinates of C as
T ∈ C} for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For any subset of codewords C ′ ⊆ C, we define the descendant code of C ′ as
The set desc(C ′ ) consists of the n-tuples that could be produced by a coalition holding the codewords in C ′ .
Using the notions of descendant codes and sets of ith coordinates of codes, Cheng et al. [6] defined multimedia identifiable parent property codes (MIPPCs) and discussed the tracing algorithm based on binary MIPPCs. Definition III.1. Let C be an (n, M, q) code, and for any R ⊆ C(1) × C(2) × · · · × C(n), define the set of parent sets of R as
We say that C is a code with the identifiable parent property (IPP) for multimedia fingerprinting, or a multimedia IPP code,
The notion of a binary MIPPC was introduced in [6] for protecting multimedia contents, which, with code modulation, can be used to construct families of fingerprints with the ability to survive collusion and trace colluders. In fact, in the multimedia scenario, for any set of colluders holding codewords C 0 ⊆ C and for any index 1 ≤ i ≤ n, their detection statistics T(i) mentioned in Section II possesses the whole information on C 0 (i), namely, we have T(i) = 1 if and only if C 0 (i) = {1}, T(i) = 0 if and only if C 0 (i) = {0}, and 0 < T(i) < 1 if and only if C 0 (i) = {0, 1}. Therefore, we can capture a set R = C 0 (1) × · · · × C 0 (n) ⊆ C(1) × · · · × C(n) in the multimedia scenario from the detection statistics T. The property an MIPPC holds makes it easy to identify C 0 , and thus the set of colluders holding C 0 who have produced R.
Theorem III.2. ([6])
Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t, any t-MIPPC(n, M, 2) can be used to identify at least one colluder with computational complexity O(nM t ) by applying Algorithm MIPPCTraceAlg(R) described in [6] .
if |C 0 | ≤ t then output C 0 as the set of colluders; else output "the set of colluders has size at least t + 1";
As we can see from the theorem above, the computational complexity of the algorithm based on binary MIPPCs is not efficient for practical use. Therefore, it is desirable to find some special MIPPCs with efficient tracing ability.
Definition III.3. Let C be an (n, M, q) code, and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is a strong multimedia identifiable parent property code, or t-SMIPPC(n, M, q), if for any
The following is an equivalent definition of an SMIPPC. Proof: Let C be the t-SMIPPC(n, M, 2), and R be the descendant code derived from the detection statistics T. Then by applying the following tracing algorithm, Algorithm 2, one can identify at least one colluder. The computational complexity is clearly O(nM ).
According to Algorithm 2, by deleting all columns {c ∈ C | ∃ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, R(i) = {1}, c(i) = 0, or R(i) = {0}, c(i) = 1}, we obtain a sub-matrix C L of C. Suppose that C 0 = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u r }, 1 ≤ r ≤ t, is the set of colluders, the codeword c i is assigned to the colluder u i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and C 0 = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c r }. It is not difficult to see that C 0 ⊆ C L . According to the definition of a t-SMIPPC, we have
We prove this theorem in three steps.
(
For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we consider the following cases.
(1.3) R(j) = {0, 1}. Since desc(C 0 ) = R, we know that there exist c 1 , c 2 ∈ C 0 ⊆ C L such that c 1 (j) = 0 and c 2 (j) = 1, respectively. This implies C L (j) = {0, 1} = R(j).
According to (1.1)-(1.3) above, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have
(2) We want to show that for any x ∈ C ′ ∈S(C0) C ′ , there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that x(j) = 1 and c(j) = 0 for any c ∈ C L \{x}, or x(j) = 0 and c(j) = 1 for any c ∈ C L \{x}. If this is not true, then for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, x(j) = 1 implies that there exists c 1 ∈ C L \ {x} such that c 1 (j) = 1, and x(j) = 0 implies that there exists c 2 ∈ C L \ {x} such that c 2 (j) = 0.
Define J a , J o to be the sets of indices where R(j) = {1}, R(j) = {0}, respectively, and
T to be the vector representing R's coordinates where R(j) = {1} and R(j) = {0}, respectively; Φ = 1;
define e j to be the jth row of C;
output "The set of colluders has size at least t + 1."
(3) At last, according to Algorithm 2 and (2), it suffices to show that any user u assigned with a codeword x ∈ C ′ ∈S(C0) C ′ is a colluder. Assume that u is not a colluder.
Then for any C ′ ∈ S(C 0 ), we have C ′ \ {x} ∈ S(C 0 ), which implies x / ∈ C ′ ∈S(C0) C ′ , a contradiction. The proof is then completed. The following is a construction for binary t-SMIPPCs from q-ary t-SMIPPCs, which makes the research of q-ary t-SMIPPCs interesting.
Lemma III.7. If there exists a t-SMIPPC(n, M, q), then there exists a t-SMIPPC(nq, M, 2).
, and E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e q }, where e i is the i-th column identity vector, i.e., all its coordinates are 0 except the i-th one being 1. Let f : Q −→ E be the bijective mapping such that
T . Obviously, f (c) is a binary column vector of length nq. We define a new (nq, M, 2) code F = {f (c 1 ), f (c 2 ), . . . , f (c M )}, and show that F is in fact a t-SMIPPC.
Consider any F 0 ⊆ F with |F 0 | ≤ t, and S(
. Similarly, we can define M MIP P C (t, n, q) = max{M | there exists a t-MIPPC(n, M, q)} and optimal t-MIPPC(n, M, q)s. In this section, We establish two equivalences in Corollary IV.5 and Theorem IV.7, respectively. Based on these two relationships and the known results in Lemmas IV.2 and IV.8, several infinite series of optimal t-SMIPPC(2, M, q)s with t = 2, 3 are derived.
Separable codes (t-SCs) defined as follows were well studied in [7] , [8] , [9] . Definition IV.1. ( [9] ) Let C be an (n, M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is a t-separable code, or t-SC(n, M, q), if for any
Similar to M SMIP P C (t, n, q) and optimal t-SMIPPC(n, M, q)s, we can define M SC (t, n, q) = max{M | there exists a t-SC(n, M, q)} and optimal t-SC(n, M, q)s. The following optimal SCs come from [7] , [8] .
The following result will be used to obtain the equivalence between a 2-SMIPPC(2, M, q) and a 2-SC(2, M, q).
q) if and only if it is a 2-MIPPC(2, M, q).
Proof: According to Lemma III.5, it suffices to consider the sufficiency. Let C be a 2-MIPPC(2, M, q), which implies that C is a 2-SC(2, M, q) from Theorem IV.3. Assume that C is not a 2-SMIPPC(2, M, q). Then there exists C 0 ⊆ C,
We now consider the Hamming distance d(c 1 , c 2 ) of c 1 and c 2 .
The proof is then completed.
The following result comes from Theorems IV.3 and IV.4.
q) if and only if it is a 2-SC(2, M, q).
F Thus, according to Lemma IV.2 and Corollary IV.5, one can obtain optimal 2-SMIPPC(2, M, q)s.
Corollary IV.6. Let k ≥ 2 be a prime power. Then there is an optimal 2-SMIPPC(2, M, q) for any q ∈ {k 2 − 1,
Similarly, we also find an equivalence between a 3-SMIPPC(2, M, q) and a 3-MIPPC(2, M, q) as follows.
q) if and only if it is a 3-MIPPC(2, M, q).
Proof: By Lemma III.5, it suffices to consider the sufficiency. Suppose that C is a 3-MIPPC(2, M, q). Then C is also a 2-MIPPC(2, M, q), which implies that C is a 2-
Then, at least one of the following cases should occur. However, we can prove none of them is possible.
and
we only need to consider the case b i = b j , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3, since we can consider the other two cases in a similar way with (2.1) and (2.2). In this case, we have
= ∅ since C is a 3-MIPPC, a contradiction to the assumption. So desc(C 0 ) C contains at least one of the words c 4 , c 5 , c 6 , c 7 , c 8 , c 9 . Without loss of generality, we only need to consider the case
, and {c 1 , c 2 } {c 4 , c 6 } = ∅, a contradiction to the definition of a 3-MIPPC. We will show that c 7 ,
The proof is then completed. The above theorem shows that the following optimal 3-MIPPCs of length 2 are in fact optimal 3-SMIPPCs of length 2.
Lemma IV.8. ( [6] ) There exists an optimal 3-MIPPC(2, (k 2 + 1)(k + 1) 2 , (k 2 + 1)(k + 1)) for any prime power k.
Corollary IV.9. There exists an optimal 3-SMIPPC(2, (k 2 + 1)(k + 1) 2 , (k 2 + 1)(k + 1)) for any prime power k.
V. 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q)
In this section, we will investigate the combinatorial properties of a 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q), and then derive forbidden configurations of a 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q). Optimal 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q)s are also constructed for each q ≡ 0, 1, 2, 5 (mod 6).
A. General idea
At first, one can easily derive the following result from Lemma III.5 and Theorem IV.3.
Corollary V.1. Any 2-SMIPPC(n, M, q) is a 2-SC(n, M, q).
Thus, M SMIP P C (2, n, q) ≤ M SC (2, n, q), and we can investigate 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q)s based on 2-SC(3, M, q)s. Next, we try to find out forbidden configurations of a 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q). 
Theorem V.6. Let C be a 2-SC(3, M, q). Then C is a 2-
SMIPPC(3, M, q) if and only if for any
T } ⊆ C, where a 1 = a 2 , b 1 = b 2 , and e 1 = e 2 , such that desc(C 0 ) C is of type IV, then we can derive that desc({c 1 ,
T } = ∅, a contradiction to the definition of a 2-SMIPPC.
Conversely, suppose that C is a 2-SC(3, M, q), and for any
, and e 1 = e 2 , we have desc(C 0 ) C is not of type IV. We will show
(2) If there exists C ′′ ∈ S(C 0 ) such that C 0 ⊆ C ′′ , then by Lemma V.5, we know that desc(C 0 ) C is of one of the four types mentioned in Lemma V.5. Since desc(C 0 ) C is not of type IV, we know that desc(C 0 ) C is of one of the types I, II, III.
(2.1) If desc(C 0 ) C is of type I, then for any C ′ ∈ S(C 0 ), we have C ′ ⊆ desc(C 0 ) C, and thus c 2 ∈ C ′ , otherwise,
Therefore, C is a 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q).
To construct 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q)s, a cyclic difference matrix is needed.
Definition V.7. A cyclic difference matrix
Similar to [8] , suppose that there exists a (q, 3, 1)-CDM D. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
Let S be a 3 × w matrix on Z q as follows.
(ii) (1) C in the form (iii) is a 2-SC(3, q(q + w), q); (2) For any two columns (0, s i , t i ) T and (0, s j , t j )
Then we have
Theorem V.9. Suppose that C is a 2-SC(3, q(q + w), q) in the form (iii) on Z q , and E = {(y,
Then C is a 2-SMIPPC(3, q(q + w), q) provided that the following hold:
(II) There do not exist distinct y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ∈ Z q and 1
Proof: It is not difficult to check that C D and C S are codes with minimum distance 2. Assume that C is not a 2-SMIPPC. According to Theorem V.6, there exists
T , (a 2 , b 2 , e 2 ) T } ⊆ C, where a 1 = a 2 , b 1 = b 2 , and e 1 = e 2 , such that desc(C 0 ) C is of the following type:
T , where k, y ∈ Z q , and c 3 = (k, k + y, e 2 )
T ,
T . It is easy to see that a 2 = k. Since C D has minimum distance 2, we have c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ∈ C S . Then there exist
T , c 5 = (a 2 , a 2 + s i3 , a 2 + t i3 ) T . Since C S has minimum distance 2 and c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ∈ C S , we have
Obviously, i 1 = i 2 . We can also derive i 1 = i 3 , otherwise, if i 1 = i 3 , then k = a 2 , a contradiction. Similarly, i 2 = i 3 . So i 1 , i 2 and i 3 are all distinct, and we have
T . So we have
a contradiction to condition (I). So this case is impossible.
T . It is easy to see that a 2 = k. Since C S has minimum distance 2, we have c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ∈ C D . Then there exist y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ∈ Z q such that c 3 = (k, k+y 1 , k+x y1 )
T , c 4 = (k, k+y 2 , k+x y2 ) T , c 5 = (a 2 , a 2 +y 3 , a 2 +x y3 )
T . Since C D has minimum distance 2 and c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ∈ C D , we have
If y 1 = y 3 , then k = a 2 , a contradiction. So, y 1 = y 3 Similarly, y 2 = y 3 . So y 1 , y 2 and y 3 are all distinct, and we have
T . So we can have
a contradiction to condition (II). So this case is impossible.
a contradiction to condition (II). So this case is impossible. Therefore, C is a 2-SMIPPC(3, q(q + w), q).
B. The case q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6)
We now consider the case q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6). To simplify our discussion, let
and S in the form (ii), respectively. Then we have two new matrices:
It is easy to check that Proof: We apply Theorem V.8. It is not difficult to check that |{s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s w }| = |{3s 1 , 3s 2 , . . . , 3s w }| = |{2s 1 , 2s 2 , . . . , 2s w }| = w from the fact q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6). For any two columns (0, s i , 3s i )
T and (0, s j , 3s j )
Then 3s i − 2y = 3s i − 4s i = −s i = 0,
Then the conclusion comes from Theorem V.8. Proof: According to Theorem V.10, we know that C 1 is a 2-SC. Assume that C is not a 2-SMIPPC, then one of conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem V.9 does not hold.
(1) Assume that condition (I) of Theorem V.9 does not hold. ( 
15 2 s i = 3s i , which implies s i = 0, a contradiction to condition (I).
The above (1) and (2) show that conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem V.9 always hold, which implies that C 1 is a 2-SMIPPC from Theorem V.9. Now, we use Theorem V.11 to construct optimal 2-SMIPPC(3, M, q)s for q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6).
Lemma V.12. If q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6) and q ≡ 0 (mod 13), then there exists a 2-SMIPPC(3, q 2 + q(q−1) 2
, q).
Proof: Let C 1 be in the form (vi) and A 1 = {1, 2, . . . , 
Proof: Let q = 13r. Suppose that C 1 is in the form (vi) and A 1 = {1, . . . , 4r − 1, 4r + 1, . . . , Table 1 From Table 1 , we know that for any b ∈ {r, 2r, 3r, 5r, 6r, 9r}, one of the elements , q) for any q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6).
C. The case q ≡ 0, 2 (mod 6)
Next, we deal with the case q ≡ 0, 2 (mod 6). Let s = q−1, then s ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6).
In order to describe our constructions, we introduce a new element ∞ / ∈ Z s , and for any a ∈ Z s , we define
We now define a code 
According to Theorem V.10, we know that C 2 = C D2 C S2 is a 2-SC(3, s(s + w), s) defined on Z s . Hence, in C 2 , |A j g1
A j g2 | ≤ 1 holds for any positive integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 and any distinct g 1 , g 2 ∈ Z s from Lemma V.2. Now we define
According to Lemma V.2, in order to prove that C ′ 2 is a 2-SC, it suffices to show that |B j g1 B j g2 | ≤ 1 holds for any positive integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, and any distinct g 1 , g 2 ∈ Z s {∞}.
Since for any distinct
T }. Then |B 
is not a 2-SMIPPC. According to Theorem V.6, there exists
, where a 1 = a 2 , b 1 = b 2 , and e 1 = e 2 , such that desc(C 0 ) C ′ 2 is of the following type:
, and also c 2 ∈ C 2 . According to the proofs of Theorems V.9 and V.11, this case is impossible.
T . Since s ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6) and m = 0, we have −2m = m, which implies c 4 / ∈ C T2 . Since −2m / ∈ A 3 , we can derive that c 4 / ∈ C S2 . Hence c 4 ∈ C D2 , which, together with the fact that C D2 has minimum distance 2, implies c 4 = c 1 , a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
( (
A i , we know that c 3 , c 4 , c 5 / ∈ C T2 , which implies c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ∈ C 2 = C D2 C S2 , and also c 2 ∈ C 2 . According to the proofs of Theorems V.9 and V.11, this case is impossible. 
(1) Obviously, m = 0, and − For any q ∈ {20, 26, 32, 38}, let s = q − 1, C (q) be in the form (vii), A 1 = A (q) , and m = m (q) . Then the conclusion comes from Theorem V. 16 .
The following result comes from Lemmas V.17-V.21 and Theorem V.4. 
For each q ∈ {6, 8}, we want to find the set A 1 and the element m satisfying the conditions (I)-(IV) of Theorem V. 16 . Unfortunately, we fail to do this. However, we can construct a 2-SMIPPC(3, T . Assume not. Obviously, c 3 , c 4 , c 5 / ∈ C D2 , because of the fact that C D2 has minimum distance 2 and c 1 ∈ C D2 . It is not difficult to see that c 3 , c 5 / ∈ C S2 since 3 / ∈ A 1 A 2 , which implies c 3 , c 5 ∈ C T2 . Hence c 3 = (k, k + 3, ∞)
T , c 5 = (∞, k+3, k+1) T , and c 2 = (∞, ∞, ∞) T , which implies c 4 = (k, ∞, k + 1)
T . Clearly, since m = 3 = −1, we know that c 4 = (k, ∞, k + 1)
T / ∈ C ′ 2 , a contradiction. So, C ′ 2 is a 2-SMIPPC(3, 51, 6). Lemma V.24. There exists a 2-SMIPPC (3, 92, 8) .
, q) for any positive integer q ≡ 0, 2 (mod 6) > 2.
Finally, we can also construct an optimal binary 2-SMIPPC of length 3.
Lemma V.27. There exists an optimal 2-SMIPPC(3, 4, 2). In order to show that the code C above is optimal, we only need to prove that there is no 2-SMIPPC(3, M, 2) with M ≥ 5. Assume not. Suppose C ′ is a 2-SMIPPC(3, M, 2) with M ≥ 5. Noting that q = 2, we know that M ≤ 8. Choose arbitrary 5 codewords c i = (a i , b i , e i ) ∈ C ′ , 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Then there must be two codewords c i and c j , 1 ≤ i = j ≤ 5, such that
